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Abstract 
This paper is primarily concerned with assessing the bias of the CNB’s predictions in re-
lation to undershooting of the inflation target. We conclude that the inflation prediction 
error has decreased over time. We further point out that GDP growth and interest rates 
were, respectively, above and below the forecast most of the time, even in a situation of 
systematic undershooting of the target. Thus, the undershooting cannot be explained with 
the  help of standard demand mechanisms. Positive supply impulses were admittedly 
underestimated in the past. According to our findings, about half of the apparent target 
undershooting in 2003 was due to errors in the predictions of exogenous factors (foreign 
interest rates, GDP, and inflation). As follows from the distribution of the inflation pre-
diction errors across separate price segments, overpredictions of inflation during most 
of the period under review were due to mistakes in the prediction of food prices and  
core CPI ex food, while prediction errors in energy prices mostly fostered convergence  
to the target. The prediction errors in regulated prices acted in both directions. 
1. Introduction 
Forecasting tools are a highly important element of the inflation targeting re-
gime. Given the forward-looking nature of monetary policy, decision making is based 
to quite a large degree on predictions of the evolution of inflation and other macro-
economic variables. Good predictions can contribute to implementation of moneta- 
ry policy objectives. The quality of predictions and prediction tools can be assessed 
using various methods. The focus can, for example, cover general methodology as-
pects, verification of the prediction model calibration, the optimal combination of pre-
dictions drawn from various models or statistical evaluation of the prediction perfor-
mance of the models (Pagan, 2003).  
This paper is primarily concerned with assessing the  bias of the  CNB’s 
predictions in relation to undershooting of the inflation target. The paper concentrates 
on the period from 1998 to 2007, without providing particular analytical details of 
the  increase in inflation above the  target at the  beginning of 2008.
1 Our analysis 
approaches the CNB’s model toolkit as a “black box,” i.e., it deals primarily with 
the resultant numerical predictions for selected macroeconomic variables and with 
their linkages
2, and does not attempt to provide a more detailed review of the method 
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according to which the predictions were developed (for a description of prediction 
development, see (Coats et al., 2003), and for forecasting quality and the success rate 
through the  lens of the  CNB’s prediction model, see (Antoničová et al., 2008)). 
An advantage of this simple approach may consist in the fact that the public inter-
prets the CNB’s forecasts in a similar way. An obvious disadvantage of the approach 
is that our statistical analysis provides no basis for identifying the reasons for pre-
diction errors (such as inaccurate calibration within the model or failure to include 
relevant variables in the model). 
The key conclusions of the paper are as follows. The inflation prediction error 
has decreased over time. While the (absolute) error of the one year ahead prediction 
recorded 1.2 pp for the entire period 1998–2007, it dropped slightly to 1 pp following 
the introduction of the QPM
3 in 2002. The trend is even more obvious in the predic-
tion for the next quarter (0.4 pp in 1998–2007 and 0.2 pp following the introduction 
of the QPM).
4 The one quarter ahead predictions from the QPM are unbiased for all 
variables under review, except for oil. For the one-year horizon, we find that the pre-
dictions of inflation, GDP growth, the 3M PRIBOR, and oil are systematically biased 
(while the predictions for the other variables are unbiased).  
GDP growth was above the forecast and interest rates were below it most of 
the time, even in a situation of systematic undershooting of the target. The under-
shooting thus cannot be explained with the help of standard demand mechanisms. 
Positive supply impulses were admittedly underestimated in the  past. The  model 
tools as a rule assessed the surprisingly high GDP growth as the negative output gap 
closing, whereas the closing was in fact postponed due to enduring low inflation. 
Repetitions of the phenomenon could lead to target undershooting. 
As follows from the distribution of the inflation prediction errors across se-
parate price segments, the  overpredictions of inflation during most of the  period 
under review were due to mistakes in the prediction of food prices and core CPI ex 
food, while the prediction errors in energy prices mostly fostered convergence to 
the target. The prediction errors in regulated prices acted in both directions. Over 
the period 2002–2003 (and also in 1999 and in 2007), lower-than-expected growth in 
regulated prices contributed to the undershooting of overall inflation, and thus also to 
1 An assessment of the CNB’s predictions can also be found in (Babecký, Podpiera, 2008) and (Kotlán,
Navrátil, 2003). The focus of the above studies is, however, different from our paper. Babecký and Pod-
piera (2008) compare the accuracy of the CNB’s inflation predictions with other financial institutions,
while limiting themselves to the  success of inflation predictions or the  explanation thereof based on 
exchange rate prediction errors. Kotlán and Navrátil (2003) analyze the  CNB’s predictions through 
the lens of a loss function.  
2 We observe prediction bias for variables that may be deemed significant for the  Czech economy: 
inflation (and certain elements thereof), GDP growth, the  CZK/EUR exchange rate, the  3M PRIBOR, 
foreign inflation and GDP growth, the 1Y EURIBOR, and oil prices. Predictions for some of the variables 
are, however, unavailable for the initial phase of the period under review. 
3 QPM – Quarterly Projection Model – the  core forecasting model of the  CNB, used since 2002Q2. 
A detailed description of the model may be found in (Coats et al., 2003). For more details of the inflation 
targeting regime in the Czech Republic, see (Fisher, 1999), (Coats, 2000), and (Kotlán, Navrátil, 2003), as
well as various strategic documents on the  CNB’s monetary policy, such as the  Long-term Monetary 
Strategy (1999).  
4 Predictions encompassing 1998–2007 are available only for inflation, while 2002–2007 predictions exist 
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the undershooting of the inflation target. At the end of 1998, in 2001, and in 2006, on 
the other hand, unexpectedly high growth of regulated prices fostered convergence to 
predicted headline CPI inflation. 
According to our findings, about half of the apparent target undershooting in 
2003 was due to errors in predictions of exogenous factors (foreign interest rates, 
GDP, and inflation), in line with the conclusions arrived at by Antal, Hlaváček, and 
Holub (2008). In other years, errors in exogenous variable predictions added more or 
less insignificantly to the target undershooting (up to approximately 10 % of the total 
undershooting). Errors in the 1Y EURIBOR predictions, when compared to errors in 
the exchange rate predictions, indicate that the assumption of uncovered interest rate 
parity used in the QPM is unlikely to be very realistic. For a larger part of the period, 
monetary policy tended to respond to anti-inflationary shocks (particularly to ex-
change rate shocks since 2004) that were out of its reach. From 2002 to 2004, 
the exchange rate depreciated more than expected by the forecast and, since 2004, it 
has been surprising due to higher-than-expected appreciation. 
Our above conclusions, however, are comparatively significantly affected by 
a low number of observations. This fact, inter alia, made it impossible to conduct any 
full-fledged econometric analysis based an assessment of the impact that the errors in 
endogenous variable predictions had on inflation undershooting, while the analysis 
results need to be taken with caution even for the exogenous variables.  
The structure of the  paper is as follows. Section  2 compares analyses of 
the  prediction tools of other central banks with our analysis. Section  3 examines 
the size and bias of the inflation prediction errors in 1998–2007. Section 4 addresses 
the inflation error distribution across separate price segments. Section 5 follows with 
an assessment of the size and bias of the prediction errors for selected macroeco-
nomic variables taken from the QPM. Section 6 considers the extent to which the exo-
genous variable prediction errors contributed to the  undershooting of the  inflation 
target. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Overview of Analyses of the Prediction Tools of Foreign Central Banks 
Certain foreign central banks have published quality assessments of their fore-
casting tools.
5 On the one hand, such assessments include more general, methodolo-
gical approaches, e.g., evaluation of the benefits of calibration compared to the estima-
tion of parameters; the pros and cons of statistical and structural models; and optimal 
combinations and aggregations of different prediction models. On the other hand, cen-
tral banks have paid attention to evaluating the  statistical performance of forecasts, 
carried out mainly by measuring forecast accuracy with the help of the size of the ave-
rage error or by testing whether the  predictions show a  systematic bias. Most of 
the central banks examine inflation and GDP growth forecasting errors, while less at-
tention is devoted to other variables (in the studies available to us), compared to our 
study.  
The Bank of England (Pagan, 2003) is a typical representative of more general 
methodological approaches. A trade-off is referred to between the structural DSGE 
models, which are built on microeconomic foundations and tell an economic story, 
5 These assessments were carried out internally in some of the banks, as well as by outsourced experts in 
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and statistical vector autoregressive models, which often possess a potential for more 
accurate and less biased forecasts, especially over short time spans. The above study 
also promotes an approach adopting a suitable combination of parameter calibration 
and estimation, and describes key factors of such an optimum combination. The stu-
dy recommends that the results of a larger number of prediction models be used in 
order to have diversification of methodological approaches and forecasts.  
Sveriges Riksbank has produced a comparatively extensive document (Giavaz-
zi, Mishkin, 2006) to assess the success of forecasting, with a central focus on the sta-
tistical assessment of the forecasting success rate. The study also analyses individual 
aspects of inflation targeting, such as transparency and communication, the optimal 
inflation target, and the role of asset prices in inflation targeting. The study concludes 
that the success rate of monetary policy in Sweden increased markedly following 
the introduction of inflation targeting. It states that the inflation target kept on being 
undershot and that this was accompanied by a loss in the form of a lower GDP and 
higher unemployment rate. This, however, cannot be attributed to errors in monetary 
policy. The set of forecasting tools was assessed as being reliable and, according to 
the authors, the errors in the inflation forecasts could hardly have been prevented. 
However, the study also notes that the Riksbank could have concentrated better on 
real economy developments in its analyses, particularly in analyzing increases in pro-
ductivity and in analyzing the labor market.  
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was initially predominantly concerned 
with the accuracy of short-term forecasts, while later it focused also on the bias of 
medium-term forecasts (McCaw, Ranchhod, 2004). The study establishes that infla-
tion predictions have been downward biased since 1994 (i.e., actual inflation was 
higher than forecasted). The contributing factors were underestimation of aggregate 
demand and overestimation of the  economy’s potential. Unexpected behavior of 
the  nominal exchange rate (stronger than forecasted) was identified as the  main 
source of inflation prediction bias. According to the study, improved predictions of 
the equilibrium real exchange rate, pass-through of the nominal exchange rate into 
CPI and potential (non-inflationary) output are the key to improved inflation fore-
casting.  
The Fed, in its study (Gavin, Mandal, 2002), examines the GDP and inflation 
forecasting performance since 1979, with a particular focus on the accuracy of fore-
casts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) as compared to the accuracy of 
another three forecasts: those by financial analysts; so-called “naive forecasts” (the fu-
ture inflation trend assumed to be identical with the last observed one); and predictions 
by Fed experts. The study points out that the level and variance of inflation have been 
decreasing dramatically since 1979, which has contributed to improved accuracy of 
the forecasts. It continues, however, by pointing out that all the approaches showed 
prediction failures with regard to turning points of trend changes. The average forecast 
error for GDP growth is near zero for all reviewed forecasting horizons, while the stu-
dy evaluates these forecasts as non-biased. The FOMC forecasts frequently recorded 
the lowest error and are assessed as having at least equal quality as the  financial 
analyst and Fed expert forecasts and as exceeding the naive forecasts. On the other 
hand, the FOMC forecasts as well as all the other ones were prone to systematically 
overpredicting inflation forecasts. The forecast errors were, as expected, larger over 
a longer horizon, yet they were statistically significant even for the one-year horizon. 438                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
The study further points out that the FOMC was unable to make use of the dynamic 
correlation between GDP growth and inflation for obtaining an improved inflation 
forecast. In spite of that, the FOMC forecasts were more accurate than those of 
the analysts. On the other hand, they were less accurate than inflation forecasting by 
the Fed’s specialists.  
3. Distribution of Prediction Errors of Headline Inflation, Net Inflation, 
and Core CPI Ex Food Inflation, 1998–2007 
This section of our paper discusses an assessment of the predictions for head-
line, net, and core CPI ex food inflation in 1998–2007. For the 1998–2002 period, 
the predictions for these variables are taken from the situation reports available from 
the following web link: http://www.cnb.cz/cs/menova_politika/br_zapisy_z_jednani. 
For the period 2002Q2–2007Q3, the data are taken from the baseline scenarios of 
the CNB’s core prediction model (the Quarterly Prediction Model, QPM, an internal 
database). The predictions of inflation and its elements differ somewhat for each of 
the above two periods included in the review. In 1998–2002, a conditional forecast 
was used; this assumed constant interest rates at the level existing at the time the pre-
diction was prepared. In 2002Q2–2007Q3, the  prediction was prepared as an  un-
conditional forecast, which includes modeling of the monetary policy response, i.e., 
an estimation of the future evolution of interest rates. The comparability of the infla-
tion prediction errors for the two periods is therefore rather questionable. In addition, 
the CNB’s prediction for the period from 1998 until 2002 covered a limited set of 
variables, often (particularly during the initial years after the introduction of inflation 
targeting) with shorter prediction horizons. At the same time, the predictions under 
the QPM core prediction model include a wide range of variables, as reflected by 
the wider scope of our analysis discussed in Section 5. 
We compute the prediction errors as the deviation of the point forecast from 
the  observation. The  CNB also used to publish interval forecasts of inflation in 
the form of symmetrical fan charts that to some extent reflect the different degrees of 
prediction uncertainty along an increasing horizon. Inflation predictions using fan 
charts nevertheless continued to be prepared until 2002. Even for most of the fol-
lowing period, they were still prepared based on expert judgment, while the width for 
the separate prediction horizons remained mostly constant. The data therefore do not 
allow for a simple way of obtaining both information on the variability of the pre-
diction errors and information on other properties of the statistical distribution of 
the errors for various horizons.  
In Figure 1, we present the histograms of the prediction errors computed as 
the difference between the variable’s actual value and its prediction for the 1Q and 
4Q horizons. An analysis of the prediction at the 1Q horizon may be of interest for 
two reasons. First, the new forecast always overwrites the old one because of the quar-
terly periodicity of macroeconomic forecasting, hence an error in a 1Q prediction to 
some extent reflects new information or the  amount of “surprise” for monetary- 
-policy decision making (if the 1Q prediction error were zero, the new prediction 
would presumably be similar to the old prediction even for a longer horizon). Se-
cond, inflation forecasts might have been especially uncertain at the outset of infla-
tion targeting during the Czech economic transition, while monetary-policy decision Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10                                439 
 
making might also have been taking short-term predictions into account (see Hor-
váth, 2008), with more or less identical fit of both the backward and forward-looking 
monetary policy rule. We therefore considered it legitimate to include both the 4Q 
and 1Q horizons. The 4Q horizon reflects the lower part of the monetary policy ho-
rizon, within which changes in the monetary policy settings should already be re-
vealed.  
The horizon reflects the monetary policy lag and is assumed to be 4Q or 6Q 
for the Czech Republic.
6 The lower part of the monetary policy horizon was chosen 
because of a larger number of observations (19 as opposed to 17 for the QPM, and 14 
FIGURE 1  Histograms of Prediction Errors (actual – prediction), 1Q and 4Q horizons,  
1998–2007 
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TABLE 1  Correlations of Prediction Errors – 4Q vs. 6Q, 2002–2007 
Time series 




of prediction errors 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Inflation  0.64***  Foreign GDP growth  0.76*** 
GDP growth  0.27  Foreign inflation  0.52** 
Exchange rate (CZK/EUR)  0.94***  1Y EURIBOR  0.96*** 
3M PRIBOR  0.75***  Oil  0.69*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 2  Test of Prediction Bias, Complete Period 1998–2007 












4Q bias  
(t-stat) 
Inflation  -0.14  0.36  -1.02  1.17  1.94  4.76 
Net inflation  -1.04  1.11  -1.75  1.83  4.66  7.20 
Core inflation 
ex food  -1.10  1.39  -1.71  1.82  4.55  6.21 
Note: The average error is given in pp and computed as the arithmetic average of the prediction errors within 
the relevant time series. The average absolute error is given in pp (the absolute error for each quarter is 
computed first and then averaged). Bold is used to denote the absolute values of the t-statistics for 
which the null hypothesis that the predictions are unbiased could be rejected at the 5% significance 
level. 
 
as opposed to 11 for 1998–2002). Table 1 nevertheless shows that the correlation 
between the prediction errors at the 4Q and 6Q horizons is comparatively high for 
the majority of such variables, meaning the results of our analysis would be unlikely 
to change dramatically if the 6Q horizon was considered. 
A comparison of the results for the inflation prediction errors in Table 2 re-
veals that the  (absolute) error of the  one year ahead prediction recorded 1.17  pp   
for the entire period 1998–2007, while it fell slightly to 1.03 pp in 2002 following 
the  introduction of the  QPM (for the  results after the  introduction of the  QPM,   
see the next section). The trend becomes even more apparent in the prediction for 
the  following quarter (0.36  pp in  1998–2007 and 0.24  pp after the  introduction of 
the QPM). A similar view may also be formed based on Figures 2–4, which show 
the development of the prediction errors for headline, net, and core inflation ex food 
over time. Clearly, the absolute errors of the predictions were diminishing over time, 
but it should be noted on the other hand that a higher rate of inflation might be more 
volatile (Friedman, 1977), thus resulting in a potentially larger prediction error.  
We continue by testing the bias of the predictions, i.e., whether or not the pre-
diction error is non-zero on average. The null hypothesis therefore states that the ave-
rage of the  error in the  predictions is μ = 0. The  alternative hypothesis is μ ≠ 0. 








μ  is the average error of the predictions within the relevant data sample, s is 
6 The monetary policy horizon is estimated at as long as 8Q in some economies. However, since the Czech 
economy is a small open economy, it can be expected to manage somewhat accelerated transmission through 
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FIGURE 2  Prediction Errors of Headline Inflation (actual – prediction), 1Q and 4Q 
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Note: 4Q prediction errors were not available for 1998Q1, 1998Q2, 1998Q3, 1999Q1, 1999Q2, 2000Q1 and 
2001Q1.  
 
FIGURE 3  Prediction Errors of Net Inflation (actual – prediction), 1Q and 4Q horizons, 
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Note: 4Q prediction errors were not available for 1998Q1, 1998Q2, 1998Q3, 1999Q1, 1999Q2, 2000Q1 and 
2001Q1.  
FIGURE 4  Prediction errors of core inflation ex food (actual – prediction), 1Q and 4Q 
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Note: 4Q prediction errors were not available for 1998Q1, 1998Q2, 1998Q3, 1999Q1, 1999Q2, 2000Q1 and
2001Q1.  442                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation for the relevant prediction errors, and 
N is the number of observations. The t-statistics are arranged using a t-distribution 
with N - 1 degrees of freedom. As far as the bias test results in Table 2 are concerned, 
while the  1Q prediction of headline inflation narrowly “passed” the  unbiased test   
(t-statistic 1.94), all the other predictions are statistically significantly biased.  
4. Distribution of Inflation Prediction Deviations Across Separate Price 
Segments 
This section of the paper presents an analysis aimed at identifying the infla-
tion elements that were behind the differences between actual and predicted inflation 
according to the CNB’s official prediction at a prediction horizon of 4 quarters. Com-
paring the deviation in the predicted price increase and the actual values for separate 
price segments enables us to identify which part of the price index contributed most 
to the  headline inflation prediction error and subsequently to the  missed inflation 
target in separate periods. 
Given the above-mentioned shift from a conditional to an unconditional fore-
cast it is nevertheless somewhat difficult to interpret the evolution of the total error 
over time, and it is practically impossible to compare the prediction errors between 
the two periods. During the initial stages of inflation targeting, inflation forecasting 
was conditional in the sense that it assumed a constant future level of interest rates. 
Part of the inflation prediction error with respect to these predictions therefore cor-
responds to the monetary policy response.
7 As already noted, however, the QPM core 
prediction model in use since 2002 is unconditional (in terms of the evolution of in-
terest rates). The reaction function of the central bank in the model at the same time 
ensures that predicted inflation is located close to the inflation target midpoint at 
the monetary policy horizon.
8 The relationship between the inflation prediction error 
and target undershooting is therefore much more direct in this case.  
The observed elements of inflation include core inflation ex food, food price 
inflation, energy price inflation, and regulated price inflation. We obtain the contri-
butions of the separate inflation elements to the total error in the inflation prediction 
by computing the actual and forecasted value difference for the separate inflation ele-
ments and then multiply the differences by their weights in the consumption basket. 
The  results are presented in Figure 5.
  As may be seen from the  figure, headline 
inflation was overpredicted mainly due to errors in the forecast of core inflation ex 
food (especially beyond 2003) and in the food price inflation forecast (practically 
throughout the period 1998–2003). The year 2004 represented an exception, as all 
inflation elements were relatively close to the forecast. The prediction errors in regu-
lated prices acted in both directions. Over the period 2002–2003 (and also in 1999 and 
7 If, for example, an inflation prediction were markedly above the target, monetary policy would pre-
sumably respond with an increase in interest rates, which, in turn, would lead to a decrease in inflation 
below the previous prediction level. Errors in the predictions may consequently be interpreted herein only
with respect to the ex-post assessment of target fulfillment (see (Antal, Hlaváček, Holub, 2008)).  
8 This, in fact, does not always apply. Given that monetary policy provides no ex-ante responses to the im-
mediate impacts of changes in indirect taxes, total predicted inflation may be above the target in reality. 
Monetary policy, in addition, may fail to give sufficiently strong responses to distinct shocks to be able to
eliminate them entirely at the monetary policy horizon.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10                                443 
 
in 2007), lower-than-expected growth in regulated prices contributed to the  un-
dershooting of headline inflation, and thus also to the undershooting of the inflation 
target. In 2006, on the other hand, actual core inflation ex food and food price in-
flation were once again significantly overpredicted. However, the error was “offset” 
by unexpectedly steep growth of regulated prices. Had it not been for these higher- 
-than-expected regulated prices in 2006, core inflation and food prices would have 
pushed headline inflation below the forecast in that period, too. Similarly, the unex-
pectedly sharp increase in regulated prices fostered convergence to the  headline 
inflation prediction at the  end of 1998 and in 2001. The  impact of energy prices 
on  the  headline inflation prediction error was minor most of the  time (thanks to 
the weight – approximately 3–4  % – of energy prices in the consumption basket) and 
typically acted in the direction of higher-than-expected inflation. 
It is interesting that in two out of three quarters in 2007, the prediction error 
was moving in the same direction (the prediction being higher than the outcome) for 
all the inflation elements, although the separate errors were more or less lower in 
absolute terms.  
5. Distribution of the Prediction Errors from the QPM, 2002Q2–2007Q3 
This section presents an analysis of the errors in the predictions for selected 
macroeconomic variables taken from the QPM. The prediction error for each variable 
is computed as the difference between the variable’s actual value and its prediction 
FIGURE 5  Forecast Deviations at 4Q Horizon: Contributions by separate inflation 
elements 









































































































































































































































Note: The Figure presents contributions by separate inflation elements to the deviation of actual inflation 
from the forecast. Contributions of separate inflation elements in pp are rendered in colours in
the Figure. Had the prediction fully matched the reality, the total of separate contributions above
and under the axis would have been zero. Missing prediction errors for 1stQ and 2ndQ 1999, 1stQ
2000 and 1stQ 2001 are due to the fact that, during the periods, inflation forecasting and its ele-
ments were prepared for a shorter than a 4 quarter horizon. 444                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
 
tion for the 1Q and 4Q horizons. Figure 6 contains histograms of the prediction errors 
from the  QPM for 4  quarters ahead, while Figure 8 (in the  Appendix) provides 
a histogram of the prediction errors from the QPM for 1 quarter ahead. 
FIGURE 6  Histograms of Prediction Errors (Actual – Prediction), 4Q horizon, 2002–2007 
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Figure 6 shows the histograms of the prediction errors at the 4-quarter horizon. 
It is obvious in the case of inflation and domestic interest rates that they were over- 
predicted compared to the observations. The exchange rate appreciated more strongly 
than the  model prediction forecasted. It is clear from the  histogram of the  oil 
prediction errors that actual oil prices were often located higher than predicted. Fo-
reign interest rates were on average somewhat overpredicted compared to the out-
comes. The estimates of domestic and foreign GDP growth 
9 appear visually unbiased. 
A moderate underprediction tendency prevails in foreign inflation. 
Table 3 presents the  results of the  prediction bias test, i.e., whether or not 
the difference between prediction and outcome was systematically different from 
zero.
10 While certain predictions may seem visually biased (see Figures 6 and 8), we 
identify a  statistical bias in only a  few cases (which is certainly connected with 
the low number of observations, due to which a reliable rejection of the null hypo-
thesis of an unbiased prediction is not simple to make). The results, however, indi-
cate an increasing bias with increasing prediction horizon. With the 1 quarter ahead 
prediction, we find that only the oil price prediction is biased, whereas in the case of 
the 4 quarter  ahead  prediction,  the predictions for inflation, GDP growth, the  3M 
PRIBOR, and oil prices are all biased. 
TABLE 3  Test of Prediction Bias, 2002–2007 












Inflation  -0.08  0.24  -0.85  1.03  1.34  3.99 
GDP growth  0.09  0.55  0.65  0.98  0.48  2.40 
Exchange rate 
(CZK/EUR)  -0.02  0.42  -0.37  1.23  0.17  1.20 
3M PRIBOR  -0.02  0.11  -0.39  0.57  0.68  3.12 
Foreign GDP growth  0.05  0.46  0.25  1.14  0.35  0.41 
Foreign inflation  0.11  0.29  0.14  0.60  1.42  1.63 
1Y EURIBOR  0.03  0.23  -0.14  0.79  0.40  0.65 
Oil  5.17  5.86  14.13  14.56  5.06  6.32 
Note: The average error is given in pp and computed as the arithmetic average of the prediction errors within 
the relevant time series. The average absolute error is given in pp (the absolute error for each quarter 
is computed first and then averaged). Bold is used to denote the absolute values of the t-statistics for which 
the null hypothesis that the predictions are unbiased could be rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
9 In the case of domestic and German GDP, these are so-called real time data, i.e., the data available 
when the forecast was prepared (i.e., not revised data). The real-time data are compared with the predic-
tion. In the case of foreign inflation and GDP growth, the time series consists of the German data until 
mid-2006 and then of effective “European” inflation and GDP growth. From the monetary policy per-
spective, the output gap is more meaningful as an economic activity indicator than GDP growth, spe-
cifically over the periods of extensive changes on the supply side of the Czech economy, which resulted 
in increased growth of potential output. The output gap is nevertheless an unobserved variable and cannot 
be assessed for the bias of its predictions. The reason why we review GDP instead of the output gap is, 
inter alia, that the indicator is better known and understandable to the public and therefore more visible. 
10 The prediction bias test applied works well only for stationary time series. The time series we used 
reflect the difference between the predicted and actual values and should therefore be stationary, otherwise
the prediction would have had to worsen or improve distinctly. We also took stationarity testing using
the KPSS test (this test is more suitable for short time series as compared to ADF or PP), where we did not
reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for each of the time series used at the 5% significance level. 446                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
 
FIGURE 7  Prediction Errors (Actual – Prediction) at the 4Q Horizon and Target 
Undershooting 
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Table 3 also presents the average absolute errors at the prediction horizons 
of 1 and 4 quarters. We can see from the table that, for example, the average absolute 
error of the exchange rate prediction for 1 and 4 quarters was CZK 0.4 and CZK 1.2, 
respectively. The absolute prediction error for oil was USD 5.8 for the next quarter, 
while the next year prediction recorded an average error of USD 14.6. 
In the next step, we present figures that depict the evolution of the prediction 
errors (at the 4Q horizon) and the undershooting of the target over time (see Figu-
re 7). The selected horizon of four quarters reflects the monetary transmission hori-
zon. Another analytical approach would be to compute the correlation coefficients 
between the prediction errors and the undershooting. However, as several of the fi-
gures presented below will show, the relationship between the prediction errors and 
the undershooting kept changing over time (for example, the strong exchange rate 
appreciation in 2002 and its subsequent correction the next year considerably affect 
the resultant correlation coefficients). The blue dashed line in the prediction error fi-
gures indicates the rate of undershooting of the target,
11 while the solid line indicates 
the forecasting error for the relevant variable. Undershooting of the target is positi-
vely correlated with the error in the inflation prediction.
12 
The fact that GDP growth was above the CNB’s forecast for most of the time, 
and even in the situation of systematic undershooting of the target, indicates that 
the undershooting cannot be explained through standard demand mechanisms in this 
case. It seems that the positive supply impulses acting on potential output were pro-
bably underestimated in the past, and the model tools as a rule assessed the surpri-
singly high GDP growth as the negative output gap closing, whereas the closing was 
in fact postponed due to enduring low inflation. Repetitions of the phenomenon could 
lead to target undershooting.  
The relationship between the exchange rate prediction error and target under-
shooting more or less matches the assumption of a positive correlation of these de-
viations (a stronger exchange rate will mean lower imported inflation and therefore 
undershooting of the target). The exception is the start of the period under review, 
approximately at the beginning of 2004, when the exchange rate experienced a higher 
depreciation vis-à-vis the forecast (by CZK 1–2 to the euro), while inflation was con-
siderably below the target. In this case, the explanation may consist in unexpectedly 
lower foreign growth and the  delayed effects of the  appreciation bubble of 2002 
(the latter is not visible in the figure, as the figure begins with 003Q1), the adjust-
ment for which led to overprediction of the exchange rate due to the relatively strong 
backward-looking nature of the exchange rate prediction in that period. As a result, 
the delayed effects of the overestimated 2002 exchange rate pushed the inflation rate 
down. Another period during which the deviations of the exchange rate and inflation 
from the predictions moved in opposite directions was the year 2006, when the target 
11 This series is identical for all figures. 
12 Since the monetary policy rule pushes inflation close to the target midpoint at the monetary policy ho-
rizon in the unconditional forecast, the target undershooting, from the ex post perspective, is necessarily 
driven by the  inflation prediction error from the  period(s) prior to the monetary policy horizon. A  de-
viation may occur only if an ex ante exemption is applied at the prediction preparation time. The link 
between undershooting and the inflation prediction error is not entirely perfect either, as the figure con-
siders prediction errors at a one-year horizon, while the monetary policy horizon considered by the QPM is 
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undershooting rate temporarily decreased. As can be seen, however, from the distri-
bution of the inflation errors across the separate inflation elements (see the discussion 
of Figure 5), the convergence toward the target at that time was considerably sup-
ported by an unexpected increase of regulated prices that was unrelated to the ex-
change rate.  
For a larger part of the period under review, the interest rate error was smaller 
on average than the undershooting of the target (see Figure 7).
13 This suggests that 
real interest rates from the ex post perspective were somewhat higher compared to 
expectations. The foregoing could to some extent confirm the hypothesis of inflation 
expectations anchored at a level below the target midpoint (and therefore also higher 
real interest rates ex ante). Furthermore, there is interesting mutual causality of 
the interest rate prediction errors and target undershooting in the sense of whether 
the undershooting of the target was caused by more aggressive than forecasted mone-
tary policy, or whether, on the contrary, monetary policy responded with some delay 
to the target undershooting or to the lower inflation rate, doing so with lower than 
predicted rates. A simple look at the figure indicates that, for most of the period, 
monetary policy was dominated by anti-inflationary shocks outside its reach and was 
not their likely source.  
The link between foreign inflation predictions and target undershooting ap-
pears relatively moderate at first glance. For most of the period, foreign inflation was 
higher than predicted by the forecast and could therefore hardly be a source of sys-
tematic undershooting of the inflation target. An exception could be the year 2003, 
when lower inflation pressures arising from foreign inflation conveniently matched 
the already mentioned delayed impacts of the 2002 excessive appreciation. Recently, 
too, the relationship between foreign and international inflation appears to have been 
“standard”. Similarly to the  deviation of foreign inflation, oil prices do not offer 
much help in explaining undershooting of the inflation target, i.e., the same as fuel 
prices, which were distinctly higher than expected over the entire period.
14 
In contrast to the somewhat weaker link between foreign inflation and un-
dershooting of the  target, an  interesting comparatively strong relationship exists 
between the foreign growth prediction error and target undershooting, in particular 
until 2006.
15 Weaker foreign growth may have led to a slowdown of foreign inflation 
and lower imported inflation. It would also have meant weaker demand for Czech 
exports and also lower inflationary pressures. It is, however, impossible to find 
the  two links completely reflected in the  “GDP growth” and “Foreign inflation” 
figures (see above). The errors in the 1Y EURIBOR predictions indicate, as com-
pared to the errors in the exchange rate predictions, that the assumption of uncovered 
interest rate parity used in the  prediction is unlikely to be very realistic (since 
approximately 2004, foreign interest rates have been underpredicted and, on the con-
13 It can also be seen from the figure that while the interest rate prediction errors at the 1-year horizon in 
Table 2 are identified, identically to the inflation prediction errors, as statistically significantly downward
biased, the volatility of their error is lower compared to target undershooting or inflation. 
14 In other words, had the evolution of oil prices and fuel prices matched expectations, the undershooting 
of the inflation target would have been even more pronounced. 
15 The certain weakening of the link may relate to the switch to the effective GDP growth indicator in 
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trary, domestic interest rates have been overpredicted, while the exchange rate has 
been stronger relative to the uncovered interest rate parity logic). 
6. Have Errors in the Predictions of Exogenous Variables Contributed 
to Undershooting of the Target? 
A relationship was suggested in the previous section between the undershoot-
ing of the  inflation target and the  prediction errors for separate variables from 
the QPM model. Comparing the target undershooting and the prediction errors for 
the variables “one by one” may, however, lead to a few problems. It may be, for exam-
ple, that, with respect to certain periods, the prediction errors for two or multiple rele-
vant variables have the reverse impact on inflation and that the errors offset each 
other as a result (quite often in the past the effects of unexpectedly high oil prices 
have been dampened by unexpected appreciation of the exchange rate). The errors in 
the predictions for the separate variables may be mutually related or may combine 
their effects on inflation. We therefore decided to model the link between the predic-
tion errors for separate macroeconomic variables (the prediction is from a 4-quarter 
past period because of transmission lags) and the undershooting of the inflation tar-
get, using the following regression:  
 () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
01 , 1 4 , 1 , 4 , ... tt t t t k t kt t k t xEx xEx π πα α α ε −− −= + − + + − +  
where()
*
tt π π −  is the difference between inflation and the inflation target at time t, 
thus showing the rate of inflation target undershooting (for the behavior of the target 
undershooting rate, see also Figure 4 in (Antal, Hlaváček, and Holub, 2008)),  , ti x  is 
the value of the i-th macroeconomic variable at time t and i=1,…,k, and  ( ) 4, tt k Ex −  is 
the prediction of the relevant variable at time t-4 (i.e.,  the 4Q prediction horizon).  
Given the limitations due to the small number of observations, the above link 
was estimated using a simple least squares method. As for the explanatory variables, 
only those which are considered exogenous from the QPM model perspective were 
included, i.e., the  variables whose predictions are mostly assumed from external 
sources by the CNB prediction system (Consensus Forecast forecasts were used for 
the majority of the variables considered).
16 We do not examine the role of endoge-
nous factors, such as food prices or domestic GDP growth, as it is econometrically 
unviable to successfully apply short time series to differentiate the impact of endo-
genous variables on the  undershooting from the  impact of the  undershooting on 
the endogenous variables (so-called endogeneity of explanatory variables). Conse-
quently, if we included the endogenous variables in this regression type we would 
quite likely be estimating equations calibrated directly within the model (e.g., the Phil-
lips curve). The  issue is irrelevant for exogenous variables, as domestic under-
shooting of the target may hardly be expected to affect the evolution of the foreign 
variables used. Dropping the  endogenous variables from the  regression of course 
16 The only exception was the exchange rate, the expected impact of which on imported inflation is sig-
nificant. From the QPM perspective, this is a “semi-exogenous” variable, as the future evolution of the ex-
change rate is modeled using more or less only the uncovered interest rate parity. 450                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
does not mean that we do not attempt to estimate the reasons for the undershooting 
to  their full extent, but rather means that we only attempt to find an  answer to 
the question of to what extent such undershooting was driven by external shocks. De- 
spite such a narrowed perspective, our results should be taken as illustrative only. 
A limitation in this case consists in the already mentioned small number of obser-
vations, as well as the fact that different explanatory variables impact on inflation 
through various channels and with lags of differing lengths, etc.
17 
The results are presented in Table 4. Given the relatively high correlation of 
the errors in the separate predictions, several alternative specifications of the model 
are made in columns (1)–(4), where the highest correlated variables are eliminated. 
The insignificance of certain explanatory variables in column (5), which includes all 
the variables considered, is probably affected by the low number of degrees of free-
dom and by multicolinearity.  
The estimated constant with a statistically significant coefficient of around  
-1.5 % indicates that a large portion of the target undershooting cannot be explained 
by exogenous factors. The regression analysis results imply that the higher-than-ex-
pected oil price led to lower undershooting, according to the results in column (1), 
even though the relationship is unlikely to be robust because the oil prediction errors 
in the specifications in columns (3) and (4) have no statistically significant impact on 
the undershooting of the target. Given that both oil prices and inflation and foreign 
GDP growth were more frequently underpredicted, the two factors on average made 
no contributions to the undershooting of the target during the period under review. In 
the case of the EURIBOR, on the other hand, a negative error (overpredicted actu- 
TABLE 4  Undershooting of the Inflation Target and Errors in the Predictions of Exogenous 
Factors, 2002–2007 







  [0.29]  [0.11]  [0.23]  [0.31]  [0.37] 
Oil  0.04
**    -0.01    -0.01 
  [0.01]    [0.01]    [0.03] 
EURIBOR  0.94
***    0.89
***    0.14 
  [0.20]    [0.15]    [0.41] 





    [0.09]  [0.23]  [0.39]  [0.25] 
Foreign GDP growth    0.62
***      0.56
** 
    [0.20]      [0.24] 
Exchange rate        -0.43
**  0.03 
        [0.18]
   [0.18] 
Number of observations  19  19  19  19  19 
Adj. R
2  0.67  0.81  0.72  0.47  0.78 
Note: Standard deviations robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are given in parentheses below 
the estimated parameter. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
17 Another limitation imposed on this analysis is certainly the assumption that the CNB Bank Board never 
departs from the forecast, as well as the fact that we do not consider ex ante exemptions from inflation 
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al values) was typical and EURIBOR overshooting could thus have contributed to 
the undershooting of the inflation target. If we were to quantify the effect based on 
the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (3) we would arrive at the result that 
errors in the EURIBOR predictions contributed to the undershooting of the target to 
the extent of just above 0.1 pp.
18 Since the target was undershot on average by ap-
proximately 1.4 pp during the period 2003–2007, it is apparent that the exogenous 
factors explain 10 % of the total undershooting at most. If the estimated coefficient 
in column (5) were used, the effect of the prediction error would be marginal for ex-
planation of the undershooting of the target. The negative coefficient of the exchange 
rate in column (4) is statistically significant, but with the opposite sign, contrary to 
expectations. This is due to the already mentioned impact of the 2002 appreciation 
bubble on subsequent inflation, which resulted in 2003 in a weaker-than-expected 
exchange rate accompanied by a low rate of inflation. In equation (5), the exchange 
rate appears statistically insignificant (once again due to multicolinearity). 
It is interesting to look at the considerable inflation target undershooting in 
2003. It is apparent from Figure 7 that the EURIBOR, foreign inflation, and GDP 
growth were lower than expected (e.g., the EURIBOR was in fact 2 pp lower than 
expected). That should have created pressure for exchange rate appreciation (lower 
foreign interest rates), hence it can be stated, to a certain degree, that there were exo-
genous factors behind the undershot target. If we were to quantify the “net” effect of 
the prediction errors in the case of the above exogenous variables (leaving aside their 
second-round effects on the other variables), we would get a contribution of around 
1.75 pp,
19 i.e., approximately half of the total rate of undershooting of the target in 
2003. However, as noted above, given the small number of observations there is un-
questionably substantial uncertainty as to the size of such estimated effects.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper is primarily concerned with analyzing the bias of the CNB’s pre-
dictions in relation to undershooting of the inflation target. The key conclusions of 
the paper are as follows. The inflation prediction error decreases over time. Positive 
supply shocks were admittedly underestimated in the past. The model toolkit tend- 
ed to assess the surprisingly high GDP growth as the negative output gap closing, 
whereas the closing was in fact postponed due to enduring low inflation. According 
to our findings, about half of the apparent target undershooting in 2003 was due to 
errors in the predictions of exogenous factors (foreign interest rates, GDP, and infla-
tion). In other years, errors in the exogenous variable predictions did not contribute 
significantly to target undershooting. Given the short time series, however, these con-
clusions should be considered more or less illustrative, while numerous uncertainties 
are associated with the analysis performed (such as various transmission channels of 
prediction errors for separate variables into inflation, and differing lengths of the lags 
of the impact). 
18 The simple average error in the EURIBOR predictions is 0.14 pp times the estimated coefficient of ap-
proximately 0.9, giving a value above 0.1 pp. 
19 The average 2003 error is -1.5 pp for the EURIBOR, -1.9 pp for foreign GDP, and -0.5 pp for foreign 
inflation. When we multiply these values using the coefficients in column (4), we obtain their contribution 
to the decrease in inflation of approximately 1.75 pp. 452                                Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 9-10 
APPENDIX 
FIGURE 8  Histograms of prediction errors (actual – prediction),  
1Q horizon, 2002–2007 
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